Sunday, September 1, 2019
Theory Observation Distinction
Is there a genuine distinction between observable and unobservable entities? Why does it matter? How, and why, might one distinguish between theoretical and observational statements in science? I have decided to tackle both these questions because they feed into and relate to one another. They emphasize different aspects of a prevalent debate, all aspects of which I wish to touch on. Whether the question of a distinction between observable vs unobservable entities is synonymous to the question of a distinction between theoretical vs non-theoretical statements is itself a matter of debate.Quine advocates semantic ascent, the shift in which the language we use to refer to the world becomes something we talk about in its own right. Semantic ascent is a shift from questions about objects to questions about words or statements. He says we should ââ¬Ëdrop the talk of observation and talk instead of observation sentences, the sentences that are said to report observationsââ¬â¢ (The ro ots of Reference). So obviously Quine thinks the two questions are equivalent. They have often been treated as equivalent questions, or at least not distinguished too carefully.I agree with Van Fraassen that we should at least note and respect the differences between the two ways of talking about what might be the same issue, and not make the category mistake of talking about theoretical entities, just for clarities sake. At any event Paul M Churchland disagrees with Quine that the two debates are parallel , He says ââ¬Å"we agree (Churchland and Van Fraassen) that the observable/unobservable distinction is entirely distinct from the nontheoretical/theoretical distinctionâ⬠.This disagreement / confusion as to the very terrain, layout of the questions of the debate, arises because there is the ordinary language question of how do we naturally apply the terms ââ¬Ëobservedââ¬â¢ and ââ¬Ëobservationââ¬â¢, as well as the question of whether a principled O/T distinction c an or should be drawn; as Gerry Fodorââ¬â¢s Granny says: ââ¬Å"True there is an epistemologically important distinction, that itââ¬â¢s reasonable to call ââ¬Ëtheââ¬â¢ observation inference distinction, and that is theory relative.And, also true, it is this theory-relative distinction that scientists usually use the terms ââ¬â¢observedââ¬â¢ and ââ¬Ëinferredââ¬â¢ to mark. But that is quite compatible with there being another distinction, which it is also reasonable to call ââ¬Ëtheââ¬â¢ observation /inference distinction which is also of central significance to the philosophy of science, and which is not theory relative. â⬠It is this second principled O/T distinction that I will focus on as opposed to the ordinary language distinction, I do not think ordinary language arguments bear on the question of whether there is or should be a principled distinction.Although examining what inclines us one way or another in ordinary language usage may clarify f actors that also influence us in an overall distinction, such as naturalness, entrenchment, flexibility and plasticity. After semantic ascent the question of whether there is an O/T dichotomy becomes one of whether all observation reports presuppose some theory. This slightly ignores the question of the ontological status of the entities, whether observed or unobserved, but this will come up when I tackle the subsidiary part of each question the ââ¬Å"why make a distinction, for what purpose? â⬠or ââ¬Å"why does it matter if a distinction presents itself? I think the strategy of semantic ascent is useful and justified since the debate takes place in at least two domains, the perceptual/cognitive (internal) and the observational/inferential (public)ââ¬Å"The strategy of semantic ascent is that it carries the discussion into a domain where both parties are better agreed on the objects (viz. , words) and on the main terms connecting them. Words, or their inscriptions, unlike po ints, miles, classes and the rest, are tangible objects of the size so popular in the marketplace, where men of unlike conceptual schemes communicate at their best.The strategy is one of ascending to a common part of two fundamentally disparate conceptual schemes, the better to discuss the disparate foundations. No wonder it helps in philosophy. â⬠Quine word and object. But it is a bit confusing and difficult to translate debates or points between the two, and certain debates are clearer at the ground level rather than the meta-level. There are three classes of arguments that bear on the T/O distinction: 1. Meaning holism arguments. Which tend to work against the distinction 2.Ordinary language arguments. Which tend to work for the distinction 3. Psychological arguments. Which can work for or against As well as a specific argument by Grover Maxwell from the continuity of observation with inference which works against the T/O distinction. There are two extant modes for making t he theory observation distinction ââ¬â Fodorââ¬â¢s and Van Fraassenââ¬â¢s. Fodor defends the distinction against the implication from cognitive science that perception is continuous with cognition. VanFraassen defends the distinction against Maxwellââ¬â¢s challenge that it is impossible to draw the line between what is observable and what is only detectable in some more roundabout way. Fodor and Van Fraassen have different reasons for drawing a distinction, Fodor, to defend realism, Van Fraassen to attack realism, strangely enough. Fodor to defend realism against Kuhnian relativism, and Van Fraassen to defend constructive empiricism, a form of anti-realism, against incoherence, and so pit it against realism.As Andre Kukla notes ââ¬Å"It is not surprising that a realist and an anti-realist should agree on something; but it is curious that van Fraassens and Fodorââ¬â¢s defenses of the theory-observation distinction play diametrically opposite roles in their philosophi cal agendaââ¬â¢s. â⬠Andre Kukla the theory observation distinction. But should we be driven by a philosophical agenda in debating a question? Or should we resolve the question and then decide on a position which accords with our answer? Shouldnââ¬â¢t we be neutral when we make philosophical decisions?Unfortunately in philosophy there is so little ââ¬Ëevidenceââ¬â¢ making up your mind is more a matter of achieving coherence, it is legitimate to allow justification to flow in all directions. The question of whether there is a T/O distinction is relevant to the debate between realists anti-realists and relativists in the following manner. So far as realists debate with anti-realists is concerned, the T/O distinction is optional for realists. They have everything to gain and nothing to lose by making it unravel.They have everything to gain, because the constructive empiricist position is incoherent without a T/O distinction. But so far as realists debate with relativis ts goes, realists have conversely everything to gain and nothing to lose by defending a distinction, they would defeat relativists. Kuhnain Relativism requires the lack of a theory neutral language with which to adjudicate our differences, so we get incommensurability, incommensurability leads to the irrationality of theory choice thus we get relativism. But realists cannot have an easy victory against both parties.I suggest that the realist denies the T/O distinction and so wins against the constructive empiricist. The lack of a T/O distinction does not entail relativism; a theory laden observation can still test a theory. To return to the question of whether we should be driven by a philosophical agenda in deciding a point, it must be remembered that we are concerning ourself with the question of whether there is a significant or principled O/T distinction. Its significance comes from its position within a larger debate.Frankly, everyone can admit there is some sort of distinction or difference between direct and indirect observation, the question really is how significant the difference is, whether a distinction can be drawn at a position significant enough to support any theory, the significance depends on the work it is made to do by larger theories. Paul M. churchland defines his scientific realism as a realism entirely in terms of his attitude towards the T/O distinction. He believes any attempt to draw the distinction, particularly Van Fraassenââ¬â¢s, is arbitrary.By any skepticism ââ¬Å"our observational ontology is rendered exactly as dubious as our non-observational ontologyâ⬠He is not an orthodox scientific realist; he is skeptical about the overall truth of our beliefs, the reference of scientific terms, and the convergence of theory towards truth. But he is skeptical about the success of all our theories, cognition at large, from a low to a high level not just scientific theories, and thus does not distinguish between the integrity of o bservables and the integrity of unobservables. He states that ââ¬Å"global excellence of theory is the ultimate measure of truth and ontology at all levels of cognitionâ⬠.Although churchland has exactly the same attitude to observables and unobservables, a cautious skeptical attitude, relative to his peers he has a slightly pro attitude to unobsevables, and a negative attitude to observables. This pro ââ¬â attitude to the unobservables of science makes him a realist and his slightly negative attitude to the observables of everyday life make him a scientific realist ââ¬Å"the function of science, therefore, is to provide us with a superior and (in the long run) perhaps profoundly different conception of the world, even at the perceptual levelâ⬠.I agree with Churchland as to the theoretical character of perceptual judgments, I agree that ââ¬Å"perception consists in the conceptual exploitation of the natural information contained in our sensations or sensory statesâ⠬ . Having done part of a module on ââ¬Å"the brain as a statisticianâ⬠I know that our perceptual judgments are statistical decision problems akin to gambling or any decision based on uncertain evidence.Because inputs are noisy ââ¬â the external world and inefficient transduction creates noise- the question of whether a signal is present or not will reflect the relative probability that a signal is drawn from distribution A(noise only) or distribution B(signal + noise). Biasing factors are the probability of occurrence of a member of each category, information on which is drawn from memory. Perceptual decisions rely on perception and memory, or evidence and prior knowledge, prior knowledge being essentially a theory about the world.However I disagree with Paul Churchland as to the possibility of our being trained to make systematic perceptual judgments in terms of theories other than the common sense theory we ââ¬Ëlearnt at our mothers kneeââ¬â¢ For one, I donâ⠬â¢t think we learn our common sense theory rather it is built into our genetics. I do not think we are nearly as plastic as he makes out, on this point I go with Gerry Fodor, perception and cognition are not continuous, and perception can never make judgments in terms of grand theories which we can barely conceive. The boundary between what can be observed and what must be inferred is largely determined by fixed architectural features of an organisms sensory / perceptual psychologyâ⬠Gerry Fodor Observation Reconsidered. Paul Churchland directly contradicts this saying ââ¬Å"our current modes of conceptual exploitation (perception) are rooted, in substantial measure, not in the nature of our perceptual environment, nor in the innate features of our psychology, but rather in the structure and content of our common languageâ⬠.How plastic the brain may be is an empirical point, and I think Gerry Fodor wins the debate with his analysis of the muller-lyer illusion. Fodor sa ys the robustness of the muller lyer illusion attests to the imperviousness of perception by cognition. There are both perceptual plasiticities and implasticities. Kuhn was impressed by the plasticities, but it is time to dwell more on the implasticities. ââ¬Å"To the best of my knowledge, all the standard perceptual illusions exhibit this curious refractory character :knowing they are illusions doesnââ¬â¢t make them go awayâ⬠However I donââ¬â¢t think Fodor is being entirely empirically accurate.Some illusions such as the concave ââ¬â convex illusion, in which heavily shaded circles appear as concave when the shadow is at the top of the circle, and convex when the shadow is at the bottom of the circle, which occurs because we have a strong prior belief / prior assumption that light falls from above, can be reversed or at least nullified if you really try. The famous duck rabbit can definitely be flipped at will. And the old hag, young girl illusion, personally I can never see the old hag unless it is explained to e, then I can. But anyway Fodor makes his point, we cannot always see just what we want to see or think we should see. I agree with Gerry Fodor that perception is fairly modular, and is not (probably) affected (much) by conscious explicit knowledge. Certainly the muller lyer illusion is fairly robust And I think far too much is made of the duck rabbit illusion ââ¬â Kuhn says ââ¬Å"it is as elementary prototypes for these transformations of the scientists world view that the familiar demonstrations of a switch in gestalt prove so suggestiveâ⬠.But I do not think they are anything more than just that ââ¬â suggestive ââ¬â because a scientist, does not, cannot form an image or representation of quarks and leptons in any way analogous to a duck or a rabbit, so this image cannot ââ¬Ëflipââ¬â¢. Paul Churchland seems to think we can form such images, but personally I cannot. I see the western sky redden as the sun sets not ââ¬Å"the wavelength distribution of incoming solar radiation shift towards the longer wavelengthsâ⬠.However I would say our inability to alter our perception does not damage churchlandââ¬â¢s essential point which was that perception relies on theory, implicit theory. A very entrenched embedded theory, but theory all the same. Churchland thinks the distinction between the theoretical and the non-theoretical is just a distinction between freshly minted theory and thoroughly thumb-worn theory whose ââ¬Ëcultural assimilation is completeââ¬â¢.I think some ââ¬Ëthumb-worn theoryââ¬â¢ is actually entrenched in our biology. But maybe individual differences come into play here, maybe some people are more plastic than others, or innately sensitive to some aspects of reality than others, maybe our biology is not universal. Paul Churchland says that the person with perfect pitch is not a physiological freak but a practiced observer. But I think it most likely that there is something unique about them.Maybe I am closed minded in the sort of visualization Churchland encourages, maybe thatââ¬â¢s just me, I had no luck with seeing in the fourth dimension even after reading ââ¬ËFlatlandââ¬â¢ and ââ¬Ëspeculations on the fourth dimensionââ¬â¢ whereas other people (the authors) claim to have, still Iââ¬â¢m a bit skeptical. Paul Churlandââ¬â¢s thought experiments where he gets us to imagine various other beings, with radically different physiology, beings that can visually see infra-red heat for example, raises the idea of the possibility of other sensory modalities.And although we cannot communicate with them, so they are not part of our epistemic community, there are animals on our planet who presumably sense different things to us, such as bats and dolphins. Van Fraassen insists that is ââ¬Ëobservableââ¬â¢ must be observable to us unassisted, and as we currently are, an anthropocentric conception; ââ¬Å"the limitations to whi ch the ââ¬Ëableââ¬â¢ in observable refers are our limitations qua human beings. â⬠It could be argued that Van Fraassens anthropocentric conception of the observable is not just anthropocentric, but parochial.Alternatively it could be argued that van fraassen draws the line arbitrarily: according to Van Fraassen we can observe planets using a telescope, but we cannot observe viruses using a microscope, because planets are something we could observe without any augmentation of the senses, where we close enough to them, and indeed some of them we can observe from earth, our natural position, (venus) whereas under normal conditions viruses cannot be seen.I do not agree with this objection to Van Fraassen, I think where he draws the line is one natural place to draw it if it has to be drawn, but it is just that I donââ¬â¢t agree with him that the drawing of the line here is very significant. I am a realist and I believe unobservables are generally as real as observables. F rom his drawing of the line, van Fraassen only believes in observables.Fodor lightly passes over the fact that ââ¬Å"perceptual analyses are undetermined by sensory arraysâ⬠and are only resolved by Bayesian reasoning from previous evidence / experience, and that ââ¬Å"the appeal to background theory is inherent to the process of perceptual analysisâ⬠Fodor Observaiton reconsidered. I think this fact is indisputable, and it is in this respect that perception and cognition are similar as Paul churchland maintains, both are theories and ââ¬Å"global excellence of theory is the ultimate measure of truth and ontology at all levels of cognitionâ⬠.The impossibility of our being trained to make systematic perceptual judgments in terms of theories other that the common sense theory we ââ¬Ëlearnt at our mothers kneeââ¬â¢, the implasticity of actual human perception, is irrelevant in drawing a theory observation distinction, both perception and cognition are theory de pendent. But Granted as Fodor points out against Kuhn scientific knowledge doesnââ¬â¢t actually percolate down to affect the perceptual. Kuhnian perceptual theory loading does not occur. There is some natural barrier. Is this barrier the location of the O/T distinction? I think it probably is if there is one.It is significant, but not significant for the anti-realist, it does not decide our ontology. It is significant in the realists fight with relativism since observations are theory laden, but are not necessarily laden with the high level theories that they must adjudicate between. So perceptions are laden with perceptual theory, but not laden with quantum theory. Fodor makes the O/T distinction in such a way that it is significant for realists against relativism, but not significant for anti-realists. ââ¬Å"Fodor isnââ¬â¢t looking for a notion of observationality that underwrites our granting epistemic privilege to observation statements.Heââ¬â¢s looking for a notion th at will ward off the incommensurability arguments. And for that purpose anything that produces consensus will doâ⬠Andre Kukla The theory observation distinction. Now to explicitly tackle the questions, ââ¬Å"why make a distinction, for what purpose? â⬠or ââ¬Å"why does it matter if a distinction does or does not present itself? â⬠. I have already touched on the answer to these questions when outlining the role of the distinction (or lack of) in larger debates between anti-realists, and relativists.The question of the O/T distinction has epistemological significance; it concerns the epistemic bearing of observational evidence on theories it is used to evaluate. This is part of the debate between realists and relativists. The relativists holding that observation is an inadequate basis for choosing between rival theories, the realists claiming it is an adequate basis, or there is at least something which is an adequate basis. Observational evidence also plays importan t and philosophically interesting roles in other areas including scientific discovery and the application of scientific theories to practical problems.But we will concentrate on theory testing. It seems that if all observations are theory laden then there is no objective bedrock against which to test and justify theory. The classic or common view of science is that scientific knowledge is derived from the ââ¬Ëfactsââ¬â¢ or observations. Two schools of thought that involve attempts to formalize this common view of science are the empiricists and the positivists. An extreme interpretation of the claim that science is derived from the facts implies that the facts must first be established, and subsequently a theory built to fit them.This is the baconian method building a case from the ground up. This is not how science actually proceeds. ââ¬Å"our search for relevant facts needs to be guided by our current state of knowledge, which tells us for example that measuring the ozone c oncentration at various locations in the atmosphere yields relevant facts whereas measuring the average hair length of the youths in Sydney does notâ⬠A F chalmers What is this thing called Science?. But the fact that science is guided by paradigms does not support kuhnian relativism.Kuhnian relativism can only be established if incommensurability is, that is if high level theory-loading of observation were established. As I have already argued along with Fodor, observation may be loaded with low level perceptual theory but not with high level conscious and elaborate theory. Proponents of competing theories often produce impressively similar observational data, this indicates perceptual theory loading is not that great. If science were blinded by paradigms that would be a different matter. Against semantic theory loading; Often observations reported non-linguistically, pictorially with tables of numbers etc.Late 20th century philosophers may have exaggerated the influence of se mantic loading because they thought of theory testing in terms of inferential relations between observational and theoretical sentences. Against Salience or attentional loading ââ¬â scientists under different paradigms attend to different things. Yes, but doesnââ¬â¢t always happen. And scientists may appreciate the significance of data that is brought to their attention that had not been noticed. Attentional loading is not inevitable and not irredeemable. So observation is and adequate basis for adjudicating between theories (unless the theories are underdetermined by data).In conclusion I would say there is no absolute T/O distinction, but there is enough of a difference, enough bottom up flow of justification, to defeat relativism. A. F. chalmers: what is this thing called science? Paul M Churchland: Scientific realism and the plasticity of the mind Paul M churchland: The ontological status of obsservables: In praise of superempirical virtues Gerry Fodor: observation recons idered Andre Kukla: the theory observation distinction W. V. O Quine: Word and Object Bas Van Fraassen: the scientific image
Saturday, August 31, 2019
American Military history Essay
American Military history is filled with examples of complex operations executed with varying degrees of success. (McGeorge & Wegner, 1983) The most complicated of these missions typically involve multi-phase implementation. The success of multi-phased missions is typically contingent on the actions of multiple agencies, which as a matter of course must interact throughout the duration of the mission. (McGeorge & Wegner, 1983) Historically, the nature of the interaction between various agencies with vested interest in the success of given operations has been varied. (McGeorge & Wegner, 1983) The overall success of such operations is contingent upon many factors, not the least of which is a high level of cooperation between agencies. (McGeorge & Wegner, 1983) The reasons for operational failures in complex missions are many and varied, but the lack of cooperation between agencies is one reason that is inexcusable and preventable through proper training. (McGeorge & Wegner, 1983) Background: The Iran Hostage Rescue Mission of 1980 is one of numerous examples of American attempts to rescue hostages that ended in complete or partial failure. (McGeorge & Wegner, 1983) Up to that point, the record of American military and paramilitary forces in executing successful missions against relatively soft targets had been poor. A facile explanation of this trend would be a lack of proper training and poor execution by the soldiers, sailors and airmen on the ground, but the facts do not support this hypothesis. (McGeorge & Wegner, 1983) In all cases, the failures of hostage rescue missions lay in the planning and command-chain difficulties that compromised the discretion of the assets on the ground. (McGeorge & Wegner, 1983) Task Force Baum in 1945 was a POW rescue mission commanded by General George S. Patton. (McGeorge & Wegner, 1983) Their mission was to rescue 200-300 POWââ¬â¢s being held by the Germans behind enemy lines. As a result of poor intelligence, the Task force encountered no fewer than 1500 POWs, whom they rescued. The larger number of rescuees compromised Task Force Baumââ¬â¢s exit strategy. As a result, all the POWs and nearly 300 of the rescuers were killed. (McGeorge & Wegner, 1983) The failure in this case was not on the ground, but with faulty intelligence, a problem that would become thematic in accounts of mission failures as time went on. (McGeorge & Wegner, 1983) Another example of bad intelligence compromising a mission took place in 1970. A rescue team led by Col. Bull Simmons and consisting of fifty-six Special Forces units was dispatched into north Vietnam for the purpose of liberating a POW camp at Son Tay. (McGeorge & Wegner, 1983) The assault force ended up attacking a camp that had been emptied of prisoners for at least one month. (McGeorge & Wegner, 1983) In yet another example of intelligence failure, the U. S. Marines attempted to rescue the crew of a captured cargo ship in 1975. (McGeorge & Wegner, 1983) The opposing force in this case was the Cambodians, and the operation centered on Koh Tang Island, where the hostages were thought to be held. (McGeorge & Wegner, 1983) After a coordinated assault on the island cost nearly seventy casualties (eighteen dead or missing), it was discovered that the hostages had already been released and were, at the time of the assault, returning to their own ship on a Thai fishing boat. (McGeorge & Wegner, 1983) This poor track record of agency conduct of intelligence continued in 1980, when a joint multi-service force attempted to rescue fifty three Americans who were being held hostage in the embassy in the capital of Iran. (McGeorge & Wegner, 1983) A close examination of this mission yields insights into failures that resulted from inter-agency and inter-service communications breakdowns, intelligence problems, and command issues. From the planning stage on, this mission suffered from the lack of interagency cooperation. (McGeorge & Wegner, 1983) Analysis: In the planning stage of any operation, it is vital that a number of elements be present. (Schnaubelt, 2005) The plan must articulate the organizational objective, accurately describe the current strategic and tactical situation, set forth the intended flow of events, and a definition of the expected contribution of all individuals and groups involved. (Schnaubelt, 2005) In order to have the maximum odds of success, such a plan must contain a clear indication of chain of command, robust and accurate intelligence, and sufficient secrecy to ensure the integrity of the mission. (Schnaubelt, 2005) The Iran Hostage Rescue attempt failed on many of these criteria. Of particular issue was the chain of command. (Sick, 1987) During the execution of the task, pilots in the operation later told investigators that they had no clear understanding of who had authority to be issuing orders. (Sick, 1987) This determination is an element that should have been made abundantly clear to participating personnel well before the execution phase of the operation. (Sick, 1987) In another critical example of failure of the articulation of the chain of command, the Task Force commander and his inferior officers were unclear on who held the responsibility for mission training of the helicopter crews. This state of affairs was allowed to persist for months before the execution phase of the operation. (Sick, 1987) The result of this confusion was a situation that resulted in a collision of helicopters during the aborted mission, which cost several lives. (Sick, 1987) These failure pale in comparison with relation to scope compared to the issues of intelligence that were brought about by multi-agency participation in information control. The numerous intelligence liaisons were encumbered by a specific and inflexible OPSEC (operational security) protocol, which hampered attempts to make information known to the necessary portions of the task force. (Halloway, 1980) This resulted in an unnecessary delay in intelligence compilation and analysis. It is important to note that this deficiency does not point to a shortcoming in intelligence gathering mechanisms, but rather in the inter-agency handling of gathered intelligence. (Halloway, 1980) The resulting delays in formulating intelligence estimates could have been avoided with a centralized intelligence conduit within the task force to which all relevant agencies would be required to contribute. (Halloway, 1980) This failure was justified by the decision-makers in the name of operational security, yet the fragmented gathering of relevant data made the intelligence much more vulnerable to compromise than would have been the case with a centralized intelligence mechanism. (Halloway, 1980) In the preparation phase of the Iran Task Force Operation, failures again occurred predicated on multiple agencies withholding cooperation on the basis of OPSEC issues. (Halloway, 1980) The result was a lack of a full-scale rehearsal for the operation, an element vital to anticipating contingencies, training personnel and refining operational plans. Across the board, there seemed to be more of an interest in rapid execution than in sufficient preparation. (Halloway, 1980) It is clear that a number of involved agencies would have had an issue with lack of preparation, but their objections were not given sufficient attention as the organizational decisions were out of their hands. The Joint Chiefs of Staff commissioned an analysis of the Task force operation (called Operation Eagleclaw) that was completed and presented to the Department of Defense in 1980. The analysis indicated twenty-three issues that contributed to the mission failure, and in many cases, lack of inter-agency organization and coordination were at the heart of the issues. (Halloway, 1980) The first issue addressed in the analysis was that of OPSEC. Since this was acknowledged to be a mission-critical priority, it was this element that was stressed the most during planning and preparation. (Halloway, 1980) The lack of inter-agency communication was said to have negatively effected the planning of and preparation for the operation. It was concluded that the OPSEC plan ought to have had more flexibility at least within the Joint Task Force. (Halloway, 1980) A clear delineation of who was ââ¬Å"inâ⬠and who was ââ¬Å"outâ⬠that transcended agency affiliation would have been a far more effective method of OPSEC, but interagency mistrust of the integrity of various agencies compelled coordinators to adopt inflexible OPSEC protocols. (Halloway, 1980) Despite the conclusion that OPSEC of the mission was adequate, it is clear that other issues could have been resolved in the preparation phase with better cooperation with regard to OPSEC. A second issue addressed in this mission was the fact that the planning did not include all necessary agencies at all stages. (Halloway, 1980) The planning team began with a limited number, and was expanded as the contingency became more of a definite probability. The haphazard organization of the Joint Task Force created gaps in planning and contingency that might have (but did not, in this case) compromised the success of this mission. (Halloway, 1980) In the absence of a standing task force consisting of multi-agency input, the necessary agencies should have been determined in advanced and all agencies should have been privy to all elements of planning. Again, the justification for the ââ¬Å"need-to-knowâ⬠contribution to the plan was OPSEC. (Halloway, 1980) The report also noted that intelligence coordination for the mission was executed in the same ad hoc manner, and reporting mechanisms were inconsistent, as task force command got direct reports from some agencies while others reported to component commanders. (Halloway, 1980) As cohesive, accurate and timely intelligence is vital to mission success, this qualified as a major concern in the execution of Eagleclaw. (Halloway, 1980) The fact that intelligence failure did not play a role in the ultimate failure of Eagleclaw should not be construed as an endorsement of the interagency disorganization inherent in early intelligence coordination efforts. (Halloway, 1980) The fact that as planning progressed, the intelligence conduits gained efficiency is also ancillary to the critique of the earlier efforts. (Halloway, 1980) The next major issue identified in the operation was the lack of independent overview of the plan-in-chief. (Halloway, 1980) While reviewed at several phases by the Joint Chiefs, Eagleclaw was never subjected to the robust evaluation by an independent panel of qualified experts. Once again, the blame for this oversight could be laid at the feet of OPSEC. (Halloway, 1980) This deficiency may have been mission-critical, because had such an independent review board contained an expert on local climate conditions and their effect on operational equipment, he or she might have informed the Task Force leadership about the necessity of specialty equipment, repair and spare parts that could have prevented the reduction in force from eight to five helicopters, which fact resulted in the abortion of the mission. (Halloway, 1980) Perhaps the most important deficiency of the Joint Task Force efforts was the lack of comprehensive, multi-agency rehearsal of all elements of the plan. (Halloway, 1980) The execution of such rehearsal is of vital importance at all levels of the operation. At the personnel level, rehearsal gives the actors a sense of the mission circumstances in a safe manner that reflects real-time environment. (Halloway, 1980) The rehearsal is equally beneficial to planning personnel in that a run-through can highlight unforeseen practical or logistical problems in the plan, which can be corrected in subsequent planning. Again, the specter of OPSEC, along with the logistical difficulties of planning a rehearsal of a joint exercise prevented the execution of this vital step. (Halloway, 1980) An issue that also undermined the success of the mission was the constant change in the political circumstances of the hostage situation during the planning phase of the operation created a constant flow of changes in the composition and organization of the task force, which, in turn, created confusion within the command structure regarding chain of command. (Halloway, 1980) Ultimately, the operatives went into mission without a clear sense (in the case of the pilots) of the authority of those giving orders to be giving those orders. While this circumstance did not prove to be a vital flaw in this particular mission, it is a flaw that could easily resulted in a disastrous mission marred by conflicting orders, causing confusion, and, very likely, casualties and mission failure. (Halloway, 1980) The implementation of Signal Integrity contingencies was another area of major failure within the Joint Task Force. While all the agencies involved has a robust understanding and solid implementation of signal protocol during the mission, the agencies did not coordinate these protocols. (Halloway, 1980) As a result, assets entered the area without a uniform protocol with respect to signals integrity. In the case of the helicopter pilots, the maintenance of strict radio silence prevented them from getting vital updates on the weather conditions in the area, leading to some of the mechanical issues that contributed significantly to mission failure. (Halloway, 1980) It is likely that the agencies with the best understanding of the importance of the weather would have implemented an signal integrity protocol that allowed for frequent conditions updates without the need for requests from the pilots, but such a plan was not implemented because it would have combined signal integrity protocols from multiple agencies. (Halloway, 1980) The origin of the circumstances that led to the abortion of the mission was the lack of helicopters necessary to complete the task in the face of mechanical failure of three of the helicopter units. (Halloway, 1980) An independent review of the equipment parameters would likely have called for at least ten helicopters to account for the possibility of mechanical failures. Such a provision would have prevented the abortion of the mission, which was precipitated by the disabling of three of the available helicopters. (Halloway, 1980) Again, proper review and oversight of the mission by independent auditors would likely have recommended ten helicopters be mission-ready at the time of the launch of the operation. These assets were readily available and could easily been incorporated into the Joint Task Forceââ¬â¢s equipment requirements without compromising other endeavors. (Halloway, 1980) The mission training protocol for the helicopter pilots also presented problems that were in part caused by the interagency coordination of efforts. (Halloway, 1980) The Navy pilots tasked to drive the helicopters lacked operational experience in the conditions for which the mission called. The Joint Task Force Command addressed this deficiency by supplementing the number of pilots with those from the Marine Corps who had more experience flying in the expected conditions. (Halloway, 1980) Problems developed as pilots were rotated in and out of the training protocols on the basis of ability. In addition, the need to be mission-ready on short notice necessitated several two-three week sessions for training, rather than a preferred five-month long continuous program. (Halloway, 1980) The end result was a group of flying personnel who were not optimally trained, and did not have the necessary experience to deal with conditions in which they found themselves. (Halloway, 1980) The deficiency here mainly lies in the exclusion of Air Force pilots from the docket of potential pilots. It had been established after the fact that the Air Force had several pilots with operational experience in rescue missions, mid-air refueling, and other elements of the flight portion of the mission. (Halloway, 1980) It stands to reason that these pilots would have been likely to accomplish the mission training in a faster, more efficient manner than pilots without this background. When the mission commanders elected to use RH-53D helicopters for this mission, they were institutionally bound to use the pilots checked out on these machines, even though their flight experience did not match the particular mission parameters. (Halloway, 1980) Obviously, the primary factor in the operational failure of the mission was the unexpected dust storms encountered by the pilots en route to the mission. As previously noted, communication liaisons with local weather reporting services may have compromised the security of the operation, however, in retrospect, it seems that such a risk was worth the potential problem given two factors. First, this communication would necessarily be short-term, as any other weather information would be unreliable. (Halloway, 1980) This would relieve security concerns because even if the mission parameters were compromised at that point (and there is no particular reason to assume it would have been) the opposing force would not have sufficient time between the breach of security and the execution of the mission to mount sufficient contingency plans. Second, the ability to successfully navigate to the target area was a critical element in the mission, and a ââ¬Å"sine que nonâ⬠requisite of success. (Halloway, 1980) Again, in retrospect, it would appear that marginal security concerns outweighed common sense in making the determination to fly without up-to-the minute weather condition updates. Another related option rejected by the Joint Task Force was the use of C-130s in a pathfinder role. (Halloway, 1980) The employment of such equipment in such a manner would have gone further to guarantee rendezvous times and protocols despite adverse weather conditions. Crew of the mission copters lacked confidence in the navigation equipment and their own ability to use it. (Halloway, 1980) This sort of arrangement is the type of non-typical application that would raise alarms between agencies, some of whom would deem off-book applications of material as an unnecessary risk for their own assets. (Halloway, 1980) The decision of the pilot of helicopter #5 to abort mission given the particular damage to his vehicle reflected a lack of knowledge of the capabilities of the vehicle in question. Given the nature of the damage as indicated by on-board diagnostic equipment, the craft would have been able to continue at minimal risk for several hours given the speed and other operation conditions. (Halloway, 1980) The pilotââ¬â¢s decision to abort mission on the basis of this particular damage reflected both a lack of understanding of the nature of the damage, and a gross underestimation of the criticality of the vehicleââ¬â¢s participation. (Halloway, 1980) It was Helicopter #5ââ¬â¢s decision to abort that triggered a mission-wide abort, as the number of operable craft had dropped below that which was determined to be mission-critical. (Halloway, 1980) The pilotââ¬â¢s possibly mistaken decision to abort was a function of his lack of training on the vehicle, and understanding of the criticality of his component of the mission. (Halloway, 1980) The fault for these deficiencies lay not with the pilot, but with the afore-mentioned training deficiencies, and a lack of mission-brief emphasis on the lack of discretionary aircraft available to the mission. Lack of information control in the area of intelligence resulted in the pilots acting upon inaccurate intelligence with respect to the capability of the opposing forcesââ¬â¢ radar. After the fact, it became apparent that a number of pilots relied on inaccurate intelligence regarding this factor in making tactical determinations regarding flight altitude. The use of the bad information resulted in high-risk, unnecessary flight protocols. (Halloway, 1980) Despite the lack of immediate functional consequence resulting from this breach, it bears mentioning that intelligence need always be reported to the appropriate agencies for confirmation or denial before being acted upon. (Halloway, 1980) The culture within the Joint Task Force regarding intelligence flow encouraged the informal passing of vital intelligence. A lack of an interagency focal point of intelligence analysis made the confirmation and even identification of raw data difficult. It remains a possibility that the pilots placed an inordinate amount of trust in intelligence, believing it to have been confirmed by the responsibly agents, when in fact it had not. (Halloway, 1980) Such considerations are beyond the scope of responsibly of assets in action or support of action. These assets have to be able to assume that any intelligence that makes it way to them is either accurate, or that they have been informed of the probability of inaccuracy, and counseled as to the weight the information should receive in the operations. (Halloway, 1980) When the helicopters began to stray from mission parameters in location and timetable, the radio silence protocol prevented each unit from having vital information about the conditions and locations of other units in the operation. (Halloway, 1980) The USS Nimitz had the capability of conveying such information with minimal risk to OPSEC. Again, the rigidity of OPSEC protocols, brought about by inflexibly inter-agency protocols led to a critical information gap at a vital time in the mission. (Halloway, 1980) Thus, the lead helicopter had no way of knowing that #8 had recovered the crew of #6 and that #6 had been abandoned in the desert. (Halloway, 1980) Lead also could not determine whether the other elements followed him when he turned back in the dust storm, and where and when the unit had fallen apart. Most significantly, if Helicopter #5 had known that his termination would cause an entire mission abort, he might have more carefully weighed the risks of continuing. Essentially, between the weather and the radio silence, the pilots were flying blind and deaf in enemy territory. (Halloway, 1980) Yet another factor at issue was the decision to limit landing options to a single site near a road in the desert near the Iranian capital. The abandonment of the mission after the landing at Desert One guaranteed OPSEC compromise. (Halloway, 1980) The addition of a secondary landing place for refueling and the on loading of combat personnel would have opened many alternatives for the flyers and other mission decision-makers in determining whether to abort, or accounting to course and destination changes prompted by weather contingencies. (Halloway, 1980) The culmination of these factors was the abortion of the rescue mission, which in turn led to a fatal accident as the pilots attempted to withdraw back to base. The operation was a strategic, tactical and political failure. Counterargument: The conclusion that the deficiencies noted above can solely be laid at the feet of the interagency coordination (or lack thereof) is facile and inaccurate. Indeed, even given the modern day organization of counter-terrorism mission task-forces, this mission was fraught with potential for failure. (Houghton, 2001) Operational security became the end-all consideration for the missionââ¬â¢s success, which determination caused many other factors creating risk to be finessed or ignored. Contingencies such as poor weather and mechanical failure cannot be laid at the feet of poor planning. (Houghton, 2001) The clarity of hindsight makes the deficiencies in operation EagleClaw obvious, but it takes a rather torturous analysis to reach the conclusion that the deficiencies can all be blamed on lack of inter-agency coordination. There are several factors that contributed to the failure of EagleClaw that had little to do with the planning and execution difficulties endemic of multi-agency involvement. (Houghton, 2001) First the fluidity of the political situation called for necessary plan adjustments throughout the preparation phase. Second, the unpredictability of weather played a significant role in the mission failure. Such a factor cannot reasonably be blamed on the planning or practice phases of the operation. Decisions that were based on OPSEC considerations were not necessarily a product of interagency confusion. (Houghton, 2001) While it is true that multiple OPSEC protocols were combined to create a stifling procedure on information, the need for secrecy in this mission was considered of paramount importance to its success. (Houghton, 2001) Conclusion: While several unrelated factors contributed to the failure of Operation EagleClaw, it is indisputable that the compartamentalization of information and the ineffective standardization of protocols contributed to the failure of the mission. (Taillion, 2001) Owing to a faulty intelligence analysis protocol, actors proceeded on faulty intelligence. Operation Security concerns ended up compromising reasonable safely contingencies as well. (Taillion, 2001) A determination of Operation Security parameters would have been much more easily concluded by an inter-agency organization that specializes in anti-terrorist operations and is willing to subordinate specific agency protocols for the sake of mission-specific parameters. (Taillion, 2001) The organization of assets in anti-terrorism operations have since been consolidated in agencies such as Homeland Security, yet operations continue to be hampered by reluctance to share assets, particularly intelligence, between agencies. It is recommended that the culture of competition between agencies be undermined by institutional policies that encourage cross-agency cooperation efforts. (Taillion, 2001) It is further recommended that operation planners for future endeavors be encourgaged to ignore inter-agency discrepancies in favor of protocols most able to facilitate the duccess of the missions.
Friday, August 30, 2019
Bloodsucking Fiends: A Love Story Chapter 1
This is a work of fiction. Names, characters, places, and incidents either are products of the author's imagination or are used fictitiously. Any resemblance to actual events or locales or persons, living or dead, is entirely coincidental. Acknowledgements The author gratefully acknowledges those people who helped in the research and writing of Bloodsucking Fiends: Mark Joseph and Mark Anderson for help with research in the Bay Area. Rachelle Stambal, Jean Brody, Liz Ziemska, and Dee Dee Leichtfuss for their careful reads and thoughtful suggestions. My editors, Michael Korda and Chuck Adams, for their clean hands and composure. And my agent, Nick Ellison, for his patience, guidance, friendship, and hard work. In memory of my father: Jack Davis Moore Part I Fledgling Chapter 1 Death Sundown painted purple across the great Pyramid while the Emperor enjoyed a steaming whiz against a dumpster in the alley below. A low fog worked its way up from the bay, snaked around columns and over concrete lions to wash against the towers where the West's money was moved. The financial district: an hour ago it ran with rivers of men in gray wool and women in heels; now the streets, built on sunken ships and gold-rush garbage, were deserted ââ¬â quiet except for a foghorn that lowed across the bay like a lonesome cow. The Emperor shook his scepter to clear the last few drops, shivered, then zipped up and turned to the royal hounds who waited at his heels. ââ¬Å"The foghorn sounds especially sad this evening, don't you think?â⬠The smaller of the dogs, a Boston terrier, dipped his head and licked his chops. ââ¬Å"Bummer, you are so simple. My city is decaying before your eyes. The air is thick with poison, the children are shooting each other in the street, and now this plague, this horrible plague is killing my people by the thousands, and all you think about is food.â⬠The Emperor nodded to the larger dog, a golden retriever. ââ¬Å"Lazarus knows the weight of our responsibility. Does one have to die to find dignity? I wonder.â⬠Lazarus lowered his ears and growled. ââ¬Å"Have I offended you, my friend?â⬠Bummer began growling and backing away from the dumpster. The Emperor turned to see the lid of the dumpster being slowly lifted by a pale hand. Bummer barked a warning. A figure stood up in the dumpster, his hair dark and wild and speckled with trash, skin white as bone. He vaulted out of the dumpster and hissed at the little dog, showing long white fangs. Bummer yelped and cowered behind the Emperor's leg. ââ¬Å"That will be quite enough of that,â⬠the Emperor commanded, puffing himself up and tucking his thumbs under the lapels of his worn overcoat. The vampire brushed a bit of rotted lettuce from his black shirt and grinned. ââ¬Å"I'll let you live,â⬠he said, his voice like a file on ancient rusted metal. ââ¬Å"That's your punishment.â⬠The Emperor's eyes went wide with terror, but he held his ground. The vampire laughed, then turned and walked away. The Emperor felt a chill run up his neck as the vampire disappeared into the fog. He hung his head and thought, Not this. My city is dying of poison and plague and now this ââ¬â this creature ââ¬â stalks the streets. The responsibility is suffocating. Emperor or not, I am only a man. I am weak as water: an entire empire to save and right now I would sell my soul for a bucket of the Colonel's crispy-fried chicken. Ah, but I must be strong for the troops. It could be worse, I suppose. I could be the Emperor of Oakland. ââ¬Å"Chins up, boys,â⬠the Emperor said to his hounds. ââ¬Å"If we are to battle this monster, we will need our strength. There is a bakery in North Beach that will presently be dumping the day-old. Let's be off.â⬠He shuffled away thinking, Nero fiddled while his empire went to ashes; I shall eat leathery pastries. As the Emperor trudged up California Street, trying to balance the impotence of power with the promise of a powdered-sugar doughnut, Jody was leaving the Pyramid. She was twenty-six and pretty in a way that made men want to tuck her into flannel sheets and kiss her on the forehead before leaving the room; cute but not beautiful. As she passed under the Pyramid's massive concrete buttresses she caught herself limping from a panty-hose injury. It didn't hurt, exactly, the run that striped the back of her leg from heel to knee, the result of a surly metal file drawer (Claims, X-Y-Z) that had leaped out and snagged her ankle; but she was limping nonetheless, from the psychological damage. She thought, My closet is starting to look like an ostrich hatchery. I've either got to start throwing out L'eggs eggs or get a tan on my legs and quit wearing nylons. She'd never had a tan, couldn't get one, really. She was a milk-white, green-eyed redhead who burned and freckled with sun. When she was half a block from her bus stop, the wind-driven fog won and Jody experienced total hair-spray failure. Neat waist-length waves frizzed to a wild red cape of curl and tangle. Great, she thought, once again I'll get home looking like Death eating a cracker. Kurt will be so pleased. She pulled her jacket closer around her shoulders against the chill, tucked her briefcase under her breasts like a schoolgirl carrying books, and limped on. Ahead of her on the sidewalk she saw someone standing by the glass door of a brokerage office. Green light from the CRTs inside silhouetted him in the fog. She thought about crossing the street to avoid him, but she'd have to cross back again in a few feet to catch her bus. She thought, I'm done working late. It's not worth it. No eye contact, that's the plan. As she passed the man, she looked down at her running shoes (her heels were in her briefcase). That's it. Just a couple more stepsâ⬠¦ A hand caught in her hair and jerked her off her feet, her briefcase went skittering across the sidewalk and she started to scream. Another hand clamped over her mouth and she was dragged off the street into an alley. She kicked and flailed, but he was too strong, immovable. The smell of rotten meat filled her nostrils and she gagged even while trying to scream. Her attacker spun her around and yanked on her hair, pulling her head back until she thought her neck would snap. Then she felt a sharp pain on the side of her throat and the strength to fight seemed to evaporate. Across the alley she could see a soda can and an old Wall Street Journal, a wad of bubble gum stuck to the bricks, a ââ¬Å"No Parkingâ⬠sign: details, strangely slowed down and significant. Her vision began to tunnel dark, like an iris closing, and she thought, These will be the last things I see. The voice in her head was calm, resolved. As everything went dark, her attacker slapped her across the face and she opened her eyes and saw the thin white face before her. He was speaking to her. ââ¬Å"Drink,â⬠he said. Something warm and wet was shoved into her mouth. She tasted warm iron and salt and gagged again. It's his arm. He's shoved his arm in my mouth and my teeth have broken. I'm tasting blood. ââ¬Å"Drink!â⬠A hand clamped over her nose. She struggled, tried to breathe, tried to pull his arm out of her mouth to get air, sucked for air and nearly choked on blood. Suddenly she found herself sucking, drinking hungrily. When he tried to pull his arm away she clutched at it. He tore it from her mouth, twisted her around and bit her throat again. After a moment, she felt herself fall. The attacker was tearing at her clothes, but she had nothing left to fight with. She felt a roughness against the skin of her breasts and belly, then he was off her. ââ¬Å"You'll need that,â⬠he said, and his voice echoed in her head as if he had shouted down a canyon. ââ¬Å"Now you can die.â⬠Jody felt a remote sense of gratitude. With his permission, she gave up. Her heart slowed, lugged, and stopped.
Thursday, August 29, 2019
Sustainablity Marketing Plan -- 3M Corporation Speech or Presentation
Sustainablity Marketing Plan -- 3M Corporation - Speech or Presentation Example Currently, it is one of the premier manufacturing corporations. The corporation manufactures diversified products including more than 60000 different products which are observed to dominate in their respective markets. The corporation operates with 81 manufacturing sites in 28 states in the United States of America. 3M operates in more than 133 manufacturing and converting facilities in over 60 nations globally (3M Company, ââ¬Å"Inspired innovationâ⬠). The corporation is engaged in various technology oriented segments. It manufactures products for wide-range of industries such as transportation, healthcare, safety, security and protection services, consumer and office, displays and graphics as well as electro and communication businesses. In addition to this, the corporation sells its products through various channels such as through the involvements of distributors, wholesalers, retailers, dealers, as well as directly to the costumers nationally and internationally across the world (Reuters, ââ¬Å"Profile: 3M Co (MMM)â⬠). Thesis Statement The discussion intends to critically identify the initiatives of 3M Corporation for ensuring sustainable growth and economic progress. It also intends to provide sustainable marketing plan for the corporation keeping in consideration the integral aspects such as promotion. Marketing Mission and Corporate Sustainability 3M Corporation is a global manufacturer and technology innovator successfully operating across the world primarily in six different operation segments. The corporationââ¬â¢s prime mission is to earn customer loyalty and respect by effectively differentiating it from its competitors. Moreover, the company is determined to operate with uncompromising authenticity and integrity in its all operational activities. It also aims at satisfy diverse customers with innovative technologies and superior quality products and services. Furthermore, it intends to place deep respects for its investors and provi de them high and attractive returns through sustainable and global growth. The corporation in relation to its mission concentrates on continuous development of social, physical and economic environment around the world. Least but not last, the company intends to develop employees skills and leadership qualities through its continuous initiatives (3M Company, ââ¬Å"Sustaining Futureâ⬠). The corporationââ¬â¢s sustainability strategies are primarily focused on customersââ¬â¢ satisfaction and its overall commercial success within social, economic and environmental values and frameworks. Its strategies are directed towards promoting healthy environment and safety measures at its different locations worldwide. The corporationââ¬â¢s sustainability strategies also emphasize on pollution prevention endeavors through continuous development of new and efficient technologies and products to be offered to its wide range of customers. As a part of its sustainability strategies its focuses on acquiring and retaining a pool of competent and skilled workforce as
Wednesday, August 28, 2019
Annotated Bibliography Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 750 words - 16
Annotated Bibliography Example The author is an associate professor of history at Hamilton College with a vast of experience on the experiences of black-American soldiers at the hand of the white majority, despite their efforts in the war. Being well-researched for from a wide scope of scholarly materials, the book deeply covers financial and racial discrimination visited upon the black soldiers. It is a good historical on racial discrimination against black soldiers during the civil war. The author is a senior partner in the Washington, D.C., law firm Covington & Burling, and has published carefully documented articles on the experiences of black American soldiers during the Civil War for more than thirty years.Ã These articles cover a broad spectrum of discriminatory nature of white soldiers and white societies against black veterans during the civil war. A profile of the author of this book reveals that he has authored many books on civil war and has a deep sense of knowledge about the experiences of black soldiers during the civil war. The book also helps us understand the various discriminatory practices that the black soldiers had to endure like substandard medical care. The book is well written and the author has extensively researched for the book. It is recommendable to history students and I expect to learn more about the predicaments of African-American soldiers during the civil war. The author is an expert in history and is a professor of History at Princeton University, and a leading historian on civil war. The book also clearly presents the humiliating experiences the black soldiers went through in the hands of white colleagues and from their white superiors. The author has drawn his references from contemporary journalism, books, speeches and letters. The book contains reputable information that helps the reader to vividly understand the discriminatory environment the Black-American soldiers lived in. The author is an amateur scholar
Tuesday, August 27, 2019
Tedlow's Three Stage Model Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words
Tedlow's Three Stage Model - Essay Example It was a sore neck that introduced Janine Charles to the world of Wal-medicine.Her search for a local doctor's office gave her an address that turned out to be a Super Wal-Mart in Orlando, Florida.She thought about giving up and trying another address, but she instead went inside the store and wandered around.Inside, she found that space formerly used to house a small video arcade had been transformed into a medical clinic. She ended up paying $90 for an examination and a shot of muscle relaxants. Had she gone to a traditional doctor's office, the same treatment would have cost her $200. In most emergency rooms, the treatment would have cost over $500. Even better, this clinic accepted Ms. Charles' insurance. If you also factor in the fact that Ms. Charles could do her grocery shopping in that store while she waited for the pharmacy to fill a prescription for her, you suddenly have a very convenient trip (Rowland).While Ms. Charles visited a clinic that was staffed by a doctor, most of the clinics inside Wal-Mart, Target, and other big-box retailers feature nurse practitioners, who can write prescriptions in most states. The retailers do not enter the world of medical care as part of their own corporate activities, but simply lease the space to clinics. It's not just the big-box retailers who are looking into clinics, either. Because of the losses due to mail-order pharmacies and big-box retail sales, drugstore chains are also opening clinics. Rite Aid Corp., Brooks Eckerd Pharmacy, and Osco Drugs are all entering partnerships to open clinics, and Walgreen Co., the pharmacy chain with the most sales volume in the United States, is also negotiating a deal to have Take Care Health Systems LLC operate clinics in some of their retail locations. The retailers who are leasing space to these clinics hope to make profit not just from the leases themselves, but from the ancillary shopping that will go on while people wait for their prescriptions to be filled, or wait fo r their appointment to be called. It is similar logic to those grocery stores and big-box retailers who have leased space to banks, hair salons, postal service kiosks, and fast-food restaurants (Moewe). Doctors' associations, as one might expect, have raised objections about the possible problems with this type of medical care. While nurse practitioners can treat a number of simple illnesses, the American Medical Association notes that simple symptoms can be indicative of any number of serious illnesses. The primary concern of many customers, however, is a combination of convenience and cost. Doctors' offices are often seen as insensitive when it comes to a patient's time, often making customers wait significant amounts of time past their scheduled appointments. Also, the simple cost, especially for the uninsured, of an ordinary visit to the doctor's office can easily exceed $200 - and since these clinics charge rates starting at $25, depending on what the customer needs, it is easy to see that these clinics will draw many customers away from their physicians (Spencer). What factors should companies use when considering whether or not to enter the doc-in-a-box game Tedlow's three-stage model of marketing, whereby marketers move from fragmentation to mass marketing to segmentation, can be instructive here (Ellickson). Market fragmentation can be defined as "the emergence of new market segments with distinct needs and requirements out of previously homogenous segments. These new segments limit the usefulness of mass marketing and erode brand loyalty" (Dictionary of Marketing Terms). The doc-in-a-box concept still seems to be either in the latter stages of this fragmentation stage or the initial stages of the mass marketing stage. Traditionally, the relationship between patient and doctor has given the doctor a considerable
Monday, August 26, 2019
BUSINESS ECONOMICS Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1250 words
BUSINESS ECONOMICS - Essay Example This paper will discuss the concept of elasticity and how a government tax on a product -- in this instance, cigarettes -- can affect the business firm in terms of how much a specific tax on cigarette can be shifted to the buyer and how much has to be absorbed. Price elasticity (Ep) of demand is the ratio of the percentage change in quantity to the percentage change in the price of a product or service, all other things remaining unchanged. Algebraically, this is expressed as follows: where P and Q are the price and quantity, respectively. This formula assumes point elasticity instead of an arc price elasticity for simplicity sake, as our objective of understanding the concept of elasticity can be sufficiently served by this simple assumption. Price elasticity measures how responsive the sales would be in relation to changes in price. Products and services inherently have different price elasticities, so that managerial decisions on expansion or reduction of output would depend to an important degree on how accurate are the determination of such elasticities. At the outset, we may consider the benchmark elasticity = 1 as indicating that a percentage change in price is just equaled by the same percentage change in quantity demanded. Where demand is somewhat less responsive to changes in price, we can say that demand is relatively inelastic -- that is to say, a percentage increase in price triggers a lower percentage change in quantity demanded. Demand is relatively elastic when a change in price causes a larger percentage change in quantity demanded. A vertical demand curve denotes perfectly inelastic demand with an Ep of 0, whereas a perfectly elastic demand would be a horizontal demand curve with an Ep of infinity ( Ã¢Ë Å¾). An important elasticity criterion is whether a good is a necessity or a luxury. A necessity has an inelastic or relatively inelastic demand curve. A good that is inessential (or a luxury) has a relatively elastic demand curve;
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